Suppositional Reasoning in Scientific Explanations
The Role of "for the sake of the argument" Reasoning
in Scientific Inquiry
978-3-8364-5622-7
3836456222
188
2009-03-01
68.00 €
eng
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To suppose X means to pretend to change one?s belief
for the sake of the argument to include X. I examine
the role of suppositional reasoning in the evaluation
of purported scientific explanations of various
sorts, based on Hempel and Oppenheim?s
deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical
explanations.
First, for each type of explanation, I present the
suppositional reasoning conditions it must satisfy.
Second, I argue that a specific decision making
method (Isaac Levi?s) should be used to determine how
one is to change one?s beliefs for the sake of the
argument in each case. Third, I evaluate in detail
whether purported explanations, both intuitively
explanatory and intuitively non-explanatory satisfy
(or do not satisfy) these conditions. Fourth, I show
that the suppositional reasoning conditions for
explanations, when evaluated correctly,
systematically solve the many problems of the
original Hempel-Oppenheim model of explanations.
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